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1 Introduction
We take as our starting point the seminal paper of Kyle [12], where a model of asset pricing
with asymmetric information is presented. Traders submit order quantities to risk-neutral
market makers, who set prices competitively by taking the opposite position to clear the
market. Excluding the market makers, the model has two kinds of traders: a single risk neu-
tral informed trader and liquidity (noise) traders. The informed trader rationally anticipates
the effects of his orders on the price, i.e., she acts non-competitively or strategically. In the
presence of noise traders it is impossible for the market makers to exactly invert the price
and infer the informed trader’s signal. Thus markets are semi-strong, but not strong form
efficient.
In this model the insider makes positive profits in equilibrium by exploiting his monopoly
power optimally in a dynamic context. Noise trading provides camouflage which conceals
his trading from market makers. An important issue is to demonstrate that this is possible in
equilibrium without destabilizing prices.
Kyle’s approach is to first study a one-period auction, then extend the analysis to a model
in with auctions take place sequentially, and finally letting the time between the auctions go
to zero, in which case a limiting model of continuous trading is obtained. Back [2] formal-
ize and extend the continuous-time version of the Kyle model, by i.a., the use of dynamic
programming.
There is a rich literature on the one period model, as well as on discrete insider trading, e.g.,
Holden and Subrahmanyam [9], Admati and Pfleiderer [1], and others, all adding insights
to this class of problems. Glosten and Milgrom [7] present a different approach, contain-
ing similar results to Kyle. Before Kyle [12] and Glosten and Milgrom [7] there is also a
huge literature on insider trading in which the insider acts competitively, e.g., Grossman and
Stieglitz [8].
The approach of this article is to study the continuous-time model directly, not as a limiting
model of a sequence of auctions, and use the machinery of filtering theory in continuous-
time to resolve the problem, in a more general setting with time-varying noise trading. There
are also other generalizations that our approach can handle in addition to the ones already
mentioned: One is that we do not assume that the final price pT equals the signal v˜, but show
that this is a consequence of our other model assumptions.
We are able to both find the price of the risky asset and solve the insider’s problem in a
direct way, leading to a deterministic integral equation for the insider’s trading intensity β(t)
at time t , given his information set with perfect forward information, and correlated liquidity
trade.
We solve the integral equation for the trading intensity β(t) by transforming this equation
to a non-linear, separable differential equation, which calls for a simple solution. We compare
this to the solution of Kyle [12] (and also [2]). In the special case of time homogeneous noise
trading we recover the Kyle-solution. For time-varying noise trading we get the result that
the market depth is still a constant, and the expected (ex ante) profits of the insider depends
on the average volatility process.
2 The model
At date T there will be a public release of information that will perfectly reveal the value
of an asset; cf. fair value accounting. Trading in this asset and a risk-free asset with interest
rate zero is assumed to occur continuously during the interval [0, T ]. The information to be
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revealed at time T is represented as a signal v˜, a random variable which we interpret as the
price at which the asset will trade after the release of information. This information is already
possessed by a single insider at time zero. The unconditional distribution of v˜ is assumed to
be normal with mean μv˜ and variance σ 2v˜ .
In addition to the insider, there are liquidity traders, and risk neutral market makers. The
liquidity traders are unable to correlate their orders to the insider’s signal v˜. Thus the liquidity
traders have random, price-inelastic demands. All orders are market orders and the net order
flow is observed by all market makers. We denote by zt the cumulative orders of liquidity
traders through time t . The process z is assumed to be a Brownian motion with mean zero
and variance rate σ 2t , i.e., dzt = σt d Bt , where σt > 0 is a deterministic continuously differ-
entiable function on [0, T ], for a standard Brownian motion B defined on a probability space
(, P). As Kyle [12] and Back [2] we assume that B is independent of v˜. We let xt be the
cumulative orders of the informed trader, and define
yt = xt + zt for all t ∈ [0, T ] (2.1)
as the total orders accumulated by time t .
Market makers only observe the process y, so they cannot distinguish between informed
and uninformed trades. Let F yt = σ(ys; s ≤ t) be the information filtration of this process.
Since the market makers are assumed to be perfectly competitive and risk neutral, they will
set the price pt at time t as follows
pt = E[v˜|F yt ], (2.2)
which we will call a rational pricing rule. The market makers, the insider and the liquidity
traders all know the probability distribution of v˜.
We assume that the insider’s portfolio is of the form
dxt = (v˜ − pt )βt dt, x0 = 0, (2.3)
where β ≥ 0 is some deterministic function. The expression (2.3) which we here take as
an assumption, is really a result in the one-period model of [12].1 The function βt is called
the trading intensity on the information advantage (v − pt ) of the insider.The two crucial
assumptions behind this result are
(i) the insider’s traded quantity x(v˜) is linear in v˜, and
(ii) the insider is not allowed to condition the quantity he trades on price. Here the insider
chooses quantities (“market orders”) instead of demand functions (“limit orders”).
Note that by (i) we exclude possible non-linear equilibria.
Denote the insider’s wealth by w and the investment in the risk-free asset by b. The budget
constraint of the insider can best be understood by considering a discrete time model. At time
t the agent submits a market order xt − xt−1 and the price changes from pt−1 to pt . The
order is executed at price pt , in other words, xt − xt−1 is submitted before pt is set by the
market makers. The investment in the risk-free asset changes by bt −bt−1 = −pt (xt −xt−1),
i.e., buying stocks leads to reduced cash with exactly the same amount. Thus, the associated
change in wealth is (which was pointed out by [2])
bt − bt−1 + xt pt − xt−1 pt−1 = xt−1(pt − pt−1). (2.4)
1 The finite variation property of x is assumed by Kyle [12], and an equilibrium where this is the case is found
by Back [2].
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In other words, the usual accounting identity for the wealth dynamics is of the same type as
in the standard price-taking model, except for one important difference; while, in the rational
expectations model, the number of stocks in the risky asset at time t is depending only on the
information available at this time, so that both the processes x and p are adapted processes
with respect to the same filtration, here the order x depends on information available only
at time T for the market makers (and the noise traders). As a consequence we obtain the
dynamic equation for the insider’ wealth wt as follows
wt = w0 +
t∫
0
xsdps (2.5)
This is not well-defined as a stochastic integral in the traditional interpretation, since pt
is F yt -adapted, and xt is not. Thus it needs further explanation. However, since we assume
that the strategy of the insider has the form (2.3) for some deterministic continuous function
βt > 0, then a natural interpretation of (2.5) is obtained by using integration by parts, as
follows:
wt = w0 + xt pt −
t∫
0
psdxs
= w0 + pt
t∫
0
(v˜ − ps)βsds −
t∫
0
ps(v˜ − ps)βsds
= w0 +
t∫
0
(v˜ − ps)2βsds −
t∫
0
(v˜ − pt )(v˜ − ps)βsds. (2.6)
Alternatively, one might obtain (2.6) by interpreting the stochastic integral in (2.5)
as a forward integral. See Russo and Vallois [15–17] for definitions and properties and
Biagini and Øksendal [3] for applications of forward integrals to finance.
The insider tries to find the trading intensity βt which maximizes the expected terminal
wealth
E[wT ] = w0 +
T∫
0
E[(v˜ − ps)2]βsds −
T∫
0
E[(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − ps)]βsds. (2.7)
The dilemma for the insider is that an increased trading intensity at some time t will reveal
more information about the value of v˜ to the market makers and hence induce a price pt
closer to v˜, which in turn implies a reduced insider information advantage. The more trade
by the insider, the more information is revealed to the market makers about the true price.
If β = 0, only noise traders trade, and since they have no information about the true price,
the market makers do not learn from this trade (by Eq. 2.2).
One way to see mathematically that increasing β has the effect of releasing more
information about v˜, is to consider the formula for the mean square error process St (β)
defined by
St (β) := E[(v˜ − pt )2] for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.8)
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By the well-known Kalman–Bucy filter we have (see e.g., [4,5,10,11,13])
d St
dt
= −
(
βt
σt
St
)2
, where St = St (β). (2.9)
Solving this equation we obtain the expression
St = S0
1 + S0
∫ t
0 β˜
2
s ds
; t ∈ [0, T ], (2.10)
where
β˜t = βt
σt
; 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
This shows that St decreases with increasing β. In particular, we see that if β(k)t = kβt for
k > 0, then St decreases when k increases.
Let us define the information filtration of the informed trader as Gt = F yt ∨σ(v˜). Thus the
informed trader knows v˜ at time zero and observes yt at each time t . Obviously the filtration
Gt ⊃ F yt and this extension is not of a trivial type, but a significant one. For example, there
is information in Gt for any t ∈ [0, T ) that will only be revealed to the market makers at the
future time T . The key point here is that from (2.3) the order xt depends on v˜ which is not in
F yt . Since the insider knows the realization of v˜ at time 0, she has long-lived forward-looking
information.
We can now formulate the problem mathematically.
The insider wants to solve
max
β
E[wT ] = w0 + max
β
⎛
⎝
T∫
0
E[(v˜ − ps)2]βsds −
T∫
0
E[(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − ps)]βsds
⎞
⎠ . (2.11)
subject to the price p satisfying the rational pricing rule (2.2), for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Usually the assumption is made that lims→T − pt = pT = v˜ a.s., but as we will show
below, this is a consequence of our other model assumptions, provided that the insider trades
optimally. This result seems natural, ensuring that all information available has been incor-
porated in the price at the time T of the public release of the information. But note that if the
insider does not trade optimally then this need not hold.
Since there is a tacit understanding that the price process p is continuous in this model,
this result also means that the insider must trade continuously throughout the time interval
[0, T ], and we can expect that the trading intensity β must be large as t approaches T in
order for this condition to be satisfied.2
An equilibrium is a pair (p, x) such that p satisfies (2.2), given x , and x is an optimal trad-
ing strategy solving (2.11), given p. Moreover, we require that the mean square error process
St (β) satisfies
St (β) := E
[
(v˜ − pt )2
]
> 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ). (2.12)
Here S0(β) := S0 := σ 2v˜ . This assumption will be discussed and relaxed later.
2 If the price pt = v˜ for some t < T , and the agent did not trade in [t, T ), there would have to be a jump in
the price at time T , which the results of our model rule out. This would not be rational for the insider to do,
as she would miss some profit opportunities by not trading.
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We now have the following result:
Theorem 2.1 The optimal trading intensity βt of the insider is given by
βt = S
1/2
0 (
∫ T
0 σ
2
s ds)1/2σ 2t
S0
∫ T
t σ
2
s ds
; t ∈ [0, T ). (2.13)
The corresponding optimal wealth of the insider is
J (β) = S1/20
⎛
⎝
T∫
0
σ 2t dt
⎞
⎠
1/2
. (2.14)
The corresponding price pt set by the market makers is
pt = E
[
v˜|F yˆt
]
=
p0 + S0
∫ t
0
βs
σ 2s
d yˆs
1 + S0
∫ t
0 (
βs
σs
)2ds
= E[v˜] +
t∫
0
λsdys, (2.15)
where the price sensitivity λt is given by
λt =
[
S0∫ T
0 σ
2
s ds
]1/2
. (2.16)
The corresponding mean square error is
St (β) := E
[
(v˜ − pt )2
] = S0
∫ T
t σ
2
s ds∫ T
0 σ
2
s ds
; t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.17)
In particular, ST (β) = 0, which by (2.9) implies that
v˜ = pT a.s. (2.18)
3 Properties of the equilibrium
The generalization relative to Kyle [12] included in Theorem 2.1 allows for a time varying
volatility parameter in the order process of the noise traders. As a consequence, one would
perhaps expect that the market liquidity function λt would depend on time, suggested by the
expression (4.39) in the next section. The result of Theorem 2.1 is that it in fact does not.
The intuition for this can be explained as follows:
The trading intensity βt will typically increase as t approaches T , since the insider
becomes increasingly desperate to utilize his residual information advantage. In particu-
lar, from expression (2.13) in Theorem 2.1 we see that βt/σ 2t increases as t increases. It
follows from the proof in the next section, Eqs. (4.38) and (4.39), that the price sensitivity
λt can be written
λt = βt St
σ 2t
. (3.1)
where, for general β [see (2.10)]
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St = S0
1 + S0
∫ t
0 β˜
2
s ds
; t ∈ [0, T ],
with
β˜t = βt
σt
; 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
The quantity
∫ t
0 β˜
2
s ds measures the the ”amount” of insider trading to liquidity trading by
time t . As this quantity increases over time, the amount of private information St remaining at
time t is seen, from the above expression, to decrease, where St is the (mean square) distance
between v˜ and pt . It follows from the proof in Sect. 4 that if β is optimal, then [see (4.35)]
St = S0
∫ T
t σ
2
s ds∫ T
0 σ
2
s ds
.
From this we conclude that if β is optimal, then not only does St decrease over time, meaning
that the insider’s information gradually enters the price pt , but also
ST = 0 and hence pT = v˜ a.s.
The function λt is seen to depend on two effects:
(i) The quantity βt/σ 2t increases over time, which tends to increase λt as time t increases.
(ii) The quantity St decreases over time, suggesting that the insider’s information advan-
tage is deteriorating, which tends to decrease λt as t increases.
In equilibrium (i) is offset by (ii) and λt = λ is constant over time.
Notice that the important quantities are βt/σ 2t and βt/σt = β˜t in the above arguments. The
mere fact that the amount of insider trading represented by
∫ t
0 β
2
s ds is large, is no guarantee
that the market price pt is close to the fundamental value v˜, i.e., that St is small. It could be
that the amount of noise trading
∫ t
0 σsds is also large, in which case the insider could hide
his trade, and less information about the true value would be revealed to the market makers.
Similarly, we do not know that βt is monotonically increasing over time, only that βt/σ 2t is.
Notice that the equilibrium value of the price sensitivity λ can be interpreted as the square
root of a ratio, where the numerator is the amount of private information, ex ante, and the
denominator is the amount of liquidity trading.
From the expressions in Theorem 2.1 we notice that
βt = 1
λ
σ 2t∫ T
t σ
2
s ds
so βt is inversely related to λ for each t . Since the quantity 1/λ measures the market depth,
the insider will naturally trade more intensely, ceteris paribus, when this quantity is large.
From the general discussion in [12] it is indicated that if the slope of the residual supply
curve λt ever decreases (i.e., if the market depth ever increases), then unbounded profits can
be generated. This is inconsistent with an equilibrium, so λt must be monotonically non-
decreasing in any equilibrium. It is argued that this follows since in continuous time, the
informed trader can act as a perfectly discriminating monopsonist, moving up or down the
residual supply curve (i.e., the market is infinitely tight). Hence, she could exploit predictable
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shifts in the supply curve. From the analysis of Back [2] it is known that, more generally,
this slope must be a martingale given the market makers’ information. Our result that λt is
indeed a constant is, accordingly, consistent with the literature.
One would, perhaps, expect that the insider, since she knows the function σt , may use it to
further conceal her trade in that she will use a high βt at a time when σt is large. This impres-
sion is confirmed by investigating the optimal trading intensity β appearing in expression
(2.13) of Theorem 2.1.
However, when σt is low the insider must apply a correspondingly lower trading intensity,
and it turns out that the expected (ex ante) profits average out. This can be demonstrated as
follows: Consider the expected wealth of the insider
E[wT ] = w0 + S0
T∫
0
βt dt
1 + S0
∫ t
0 β˜
2
s ds
,
an expression which follows from the results of the next section. Here the last term is the
expected (ex ante) profits, which can be shown to be
√
S0
∫ T
0 σ
2
t dt .3 Thus, trading at a time-
varying volatility σt corresponds exactly, when it comes to expected profits, to trading at a
constant volatility σ determined by σ 2 = 1T
∫ T
0 σ
2
t dt , the right comparison in this regard.
The explanation is that in this model both the insider and the market makers can be
assumed to know the value of σt at any time t . Accordingly the insider cannot utilize the
variability in this volatility to further conceal her trades, and thus make additional profits
When the amount of liquidity trading
∫ t
0 σ
2
s ds is large, we noticed above that λ is small,
in which case the insider’s profit is large. However, a small value of λ is, in isolation, no
guarantee for a large ex ante profit of the insider, since a large value of S0 also makes the
profit of the insider large, and λ large as well.
This points in one possible direction for extending the present model. Suppose that the
private information is connected to quaterly accounting data for the firm, so T stands for one
quarter, and let us extend the model beyond T to 2T, 3T, . . ., etc. Let us, as in Admati and
Pfleiderer [1], imagine two types of liquidity traders, discretionary and non-discretionary.
Just after each disclosure period of length T , the level of private information relative to the
uninformed is at its minimum. It seems reasonable, from the above formula for the ex ante
profits of the insider, that the discretionary traders, acting strategically to time their trades,
should concentrate their trade to these times in order to loose less to the insider. That this
kind behavior is optimal is expected from the conclusions of Admati and Pfleiderer [1], who
noticed that λ is a constant is not in accordance with empirical findings; the bid ask spread
2λ is varying over time.
We also have the following corollary:
Corollary 3.1 Suppose σt = σ > 0 is a constant. Then the optimal trading intensity for the
insider is
βt = σ
√
T√
S0(T − t) ; 0 ≤ t < T . (3.2)
The corresponding price pt set by the market makers is given by
dpt = λt dyt , (3.3)
3 In the case when σt = σ is a constant, we get that the expected profits equal σ√S0T , consistent with
Kyle [12].
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where
λt ≡ λ =
√
S0
σ
1√
T
; a constant for all t ∈ [0, T ). (3.4)
This result follows from Theorem 2.1 by setting σs ≡ σ in (2.16). The results of Corollary 3.1
are in agreement with Kyle [12] and Back [2] (when we set T = 1).
Recently, a paper of related interest by Eide [6] came to our knowledge. Her work, which
was done independently of ours, differs from ours in several ways: She focuses on the situ-
ation when the price process v˜t of the stock is assumed to have a specific dynamics (an Itô
diffusion and a martingale with respect to an independent Brownian motion), and its current
value v˜t (not v˜T ) is known to the insider at time t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. She avoids the use of
forward integrals by assuming a priori that the processes are semimartingales with respect to
the relevant filtrations. Like Back she then assumes that the market makers set the price equal
to pt = H(t, yt ) for some function H and that H(t, yt ) = E(v˜T |F yt ). These assumptions
put the problem of finding a corresponding equilibrium into a Markovian context, which
allows her to solve the problem by using dynamic programming. In conclusion, her a priori
assumptions are stronger than ours, but they enable her to solve other problems than we do.
In particular, the final stock value v˜ = v˜T need not be normally distributed in her case.
Remark 3.2 To summarize, our paper differes from the papers of Kyle [12] and Back [2]
both with respect to basic assumptions and method:
(i) We do not assume that the volatility σ(t) of the noise traders is constant. Nevertheless
we prove that the price sensitivity λt is constant also in our case, if the optimal strategy
is applied.
(ii) We do not assume a priori that
pT = v˜ a.s.
But this is proved to be the case if the optimal strategy is used.
We remark that if we had made this assumption a priori, then our proof could have been
simplified as follows: The last term in (4.15) would have been 0. Hence Problem 4.3
would automatically reduce to Problem 4.4.
(iii) We do not assume a priori that the strategy xt is inconspicuous, i.e. that
1
σt
dyt = 1
σt
xt dt + dzt
is a Brownian motion with respect to its own filtration. However, this is proved to hold
if xt is chosen optimally.4
(iv) We do not assume a priori that there exists a function H such that
pt = H(t, yt ).
But this is proved to be the case if the insider acts optimally.
(v) Finally, since we are not assuming a Markovian setup we cannot use dynamic pro-
gramming (the HJB equation) to find the optimal strategy, but we use filtering theory
and a perturbation argument instead.
Remark 3.3 It is interesting to note that also in our general setting the total order process yt
becomes a Brownian bridge with respect to the filtration Gt if the optimal insider strategy is
used. To see this we proceed as follows:
4 Also Back [2] shows this, using a different method.
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By (2.13)–(2.18) we have
dyt = (v˜ − pt )βt dt + σt d Bt
= (v˜ − E[v˜] − λyt )βt dt + σt d Bt
=
[(∫ T
0 σ
2
u du
S0
)1/2
(v˜ − E[v˜]) − yt
] σ 2t dt∫ T
t σ
2
u du
+ σt d Bt . (3.5)
Thus yt is the bridge of the process zt =
∫ t
0 σsd Bs , conditioned to arrive at the terminal value
yT =
(∫ T
0 σ
2
u du
S0
)1/2
(v˜ − E[v˜])
at time t = T .
In particular, if σt = σ is constant we get
dyt =
[
σ
(
T
S0
)1/2
(v˜ − E[v˜]) − yt
]
dt
T − t + σ d Bt , (3.6)
and hence 1
σ
dyt is the classical Brownian bridge, conditioned to arrive at
(
T
S0
)1/2
(v˜ − E[v˜])
at time t = T .
4 The solution of the problem
In this section we present the proof of Theorem 2.1. It can be noted to be rather different
from the corresponding development in Kyle [12].
To summarize the model mathematically, the portfolio of the noise traders has the form
dzt = σt d Bt , t ∈ [0, T ], (4.1)
and the portfolio of the insider is
dxt = (v˜ − pt )βt dt , (4.2)
where pt is the market price at time t set by the market makers. The total traded volume is
hence
dyt = (v˜ − pt )βt dt + σt d Bt . (4.3)
If we let F yt , t ∈ [0, T ], be the filtration generated by ys ; s ≤ t , then it is assumed that
pt := E[v˜|F yt ], 0 ≤ t ≤ T . (4.4)
Substituting this into (4.3) we get that the total traded volume process must satisfy the equa-
tion
dyt = (v˜ − E[v˜|F yt ])βt dt + σt d Bt , t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.5)
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The main idea of our approach is that we prove that it is possible to find a solution of (4.5)
by regarding yt as the innovation process y˜t of an auxiliary linear filtering problem, where
the signal process is
d v˜t = 0, v˜0 = v˜; t ∈ [0, T ], (4.6)
and the observation process is
d yˆt = v˜βt dt + σt d Bt ; t ∈ [0, T ], yˆ0 = 0. (4.7)
The innovation process for this problem is, by definition,
d y˜t = (v˜ − E[v˜|F yˆt ])βt dt + σt d Bt
= d yˆt − E[v˜|F yˆt ]βt dt , (4.8)
where F yˆt = σ(yˆs , 0 ≤ s ≤ t) is the information filtration generated by yˆ.
As before let F yt = σ(ys; s ≤ t) be the information filtration of the process y. Then
we have:
Lemma 4.1 F yt = F yˆt ; t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof The proof of Lemma 6.2.5 (iii) in Øksendal [14] applies without changes. unionsq
Corollary 4.2 The innovation process y˜t is a solution of the Eq. (4.5) for the total traded
volume process yt .
Based on this we choose the innovation process y˜t to represent the total order process yt
and we write y˜t = yt from now on.
Note that from filtering theory we know that the process y∗ defined by dy∗t := 1σt dyt is a
Brownian motion with respect to the information filtration F yt .5
As before let
St = S(β)t := E[(v˜ − pt )2] (4.9)
be the mean square error process and define
St,T = S(β)t,T := E[(v˜ − pt )(v˜ − pT )]; 0 ≤ t ≤ T . (4.10)
(Note that if we had assumed that
pT = v˜ a.s.
then we would get St,T = 0 and the following proof would simplify considerably.)
Then (2.7) can be written
E[wT ] = w0 +
T∫
0
S(β)t βt dt −
T∫
0
S(β)t,T βt dt. (4.11)
We need to compute S(β)t,T = E[(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − pt )]: We have
E[(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − pt )] = E[(v˜2) − E[(v˜ pt ) − E(v˜ pT ) + E(pT pt )
= E(v˜2) − E(p2t ) − E(p2T ) + E(pT pt ).
5 Back [2] also has this result using a different method.
123
156 K. K. Aase et al.
We first compute E(pT pt ). By (4.4) we have that pt is a square-integrable martingale. Hence
E[pt pT ] = E[p2t ],
and consequently
E[(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − pt )] = E(v˜2) − E(p2t ) − E(p2T ) + E(pT pt )
= E(v˜2) − E(p2t ) − E(p2T ) + E(p2t )
= E(v˜2) − E(p2T ).
But
E(p2T ) = E(v˜2) − E(v˜ − pT )2 = E(v˜2) − ST (β) ,
and hence
S(β)t,T = E[(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − pt )] = ST (β). (4.12)
In particular, note that
S(β)t,T ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] (4.13)
and
S(β)t,T = 0 if pT = v˜. (4.14)
We now return to problem (2.11). By (4.11) and (4.12) we see that our original problem
can be formulated as the following control problem:
Problem 4.3 Maximize
J1(β) :=
T∫
0
St (β)βt dt − ST (β)
T∫
0
βt dt (4.15)
over all β ∈A, where A is the set of all (deterministic) functions β : [0, T )→R which are
continuous on [0, T ).
We first study the following related problem:
Problem 4.4 Maximize
J (β) :=
T∫
0
St (β)βt dt (4.16)
over all β ∈ A.
We will find the optimal control βˆ ∈ A for Problem 4.4 and show that the corresponding
terminal price p(βˆ)T satisfies
p(βˆ)T = v˜ a.s. (4.17)
It follows by (4.12) that S(βˆ)t,T = ST (βˆ) = 0 and hence βˆ is also optimal for Problem 4.3,
because,
sup
β∈A
J1(β) ≤ sup
β∈A
J (β) = J (βˆ) = J1(βˆ) ≤ sup
β∈A
J1(β).
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The first inequality holds since J1(β) ≤ J (β) for all β. The second (in)equality holds by
the definition of βˆ. The third (in)equality holds since S(βˆ)t,T = 0. The fourth inequality holds
since βˆ is just one of possible β’s in the maximum.
In view of this we now proceed to solve Problem 4.4. By (2.10) we see that the map
β → J (β); β ∈ A
is concave. Therefore we can use the following perturbation argument to find the maximizer
for J (·):
Suppose β ∈ A maximizes J (β). Choose an arbitrary function ξ ∈ A and define the real
function g by
g(y) = J (β + yξ), y ∈ R.
Then g is maximal at y = 0 and hence
0 = g′(0) = d
dy
J (β + yξ)|y=0
= d
dy
( T∫
0
St (β + yξ)(βt + yξt )dt
)∣∣∣
y=0
= I1 + I2, (4.18)
where
I1 =
T∫
0
St (β)ξt dt (4.19)
and
I2 =
T∫
0
βt
d
dy
St (β + yξ)|y=0dt. (4.20)
Define
ηt = ddy St (β + yξ)|y=0. (4.21)
By the well-known Kalman–Bucy filter we have
d St
dt
= −
(βt
σt
St
)2
, where St = St (β). (4.22)
Hence
St = S0 −
t∫
0
(βs
σs
Ss
)2
ds.
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Therefore
ηt = −
t∫
0
d
dy
[(
βs + yξs
σs
Ss(β + yξ)
)2]
y=0
ds
= −
t∫
0
2
(
βs
σs
Ss(β)
)[ ξs
σs
Ss(β) + βs
σs
ηs
]
ds.
Differentiating with respect to t we get
dηt
dt
= −γtξt
σt
St (β) − γtβt
σt
ηt
where
γt = 2βt
σt
St (β). (4.23)
Hence
dηt
dt
+ γtβt
σt
ηt = −γtξt
σt
St (β).
Multiplying by exp
(∫ t
0
γr βr
σr
dr
)
we obtain
d
dt
⎛
⎝ηt exp
⎛
⎝
t∫
0
γrβr
σr
dr
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠ = −γtξt
σt
St (β) exp
⎛
⎝
t∫
0
γrβr
σr
dr
⎞
⎠ .
Note that
η0 = ddy S0(β + yξ)|y=0 =
d
dy
E[(v˜ − E[v˜])2] = 0.
Hence, by integrating the above,
ηt = − exp
⎛
⎝−
t∫
0
γrβr
σr
dr
⎞
⎠
t∫
0
γsξs
σs
Ss(β) exp
⎛
⎝
s∫
0
γrβr
σr
dr
⎞
⎠ ds. (4.24)
Substituting this in (4.20) and changing the order of integration we get
I2 =
T∫
0
βtηt dt
= −
T∫
0
βt
⎡
⎣
t∫
0
γsξs
σs
Ss(β) exp
(
−
t∫
s
γrβr
σr
dr
)
ds
⎤
⎦ dt
= −
T∫
0
⎡
⎣
T∫
s
βt exp
⎛
⎝−
t∫
s
γrβr
σr
dr
⎞
⎠ dt
⎤
⎦ γsξs
σs
Ss(β)ds.
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Changing the notation between s and t we get
I2 = −
T∫
0
⎡
⎣
T∫
t
βs exp
⎛
⎝−
s∫
t
γrβr
σr
dt
⎞
⎠ ds
⎤
⎦ γt St (β)
σt
ξt dt. (4.25)
Combining this with (4.18) and (4.19) we obtain
T∫
0
⎧⎨
⎩St (β) −
⎡
⎣
T∫
t
βs exp
⎛
⎝−
s∫
t
γrβr
σr
dr
⎞
⎠ ds
⎤
⎦ γt
σt
St (β)
⎫⎬
⎭ ξt dt = 0.
Since this holds for all ξ ∈ A we conclude that
St (β) −
⎡
⎣
T∫
t
βs exp
⎛
⎝−
s∫
t
γrβr
σr
dr
⎞
⎠ ds
⎤
⎦ γt
σt
St (β) = 0; t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.26)
Recall that we have assumed that [see (2.12)]
St (β) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ). (4.27)
Hence (4.26) implies that
⎡
⎣
T∫
t
βs exp
⎛
⎝−
s∫
t
γrβr
σr
dr
⎞
⎠ ds
⎤
⎦ γt
σt
= 1; t ∈ [0, T ). (4.28)
From this we deduce that
lim
s→T −
βs = ∞ or lim
t→T −
γt
σt
= ∞ , or both. (4.29)
By (4.28) we see that in either case we can deduce that
lim
t→T −
βt = ∞. (4.30)
Put
u(t) = γtβt
σt
, v(t) =
t∫
0
u(r)dr. (4.31)
Then (4.28) gives
T∫
t
βs exp(−v(s))ds = βt
u(t)
exp(−v(t)).
Differentiating we get
−βt exp(−v(t)) =
[
d
dt
(
βt
u(t)
)
− βt u(t)
u(t)
]
exp(−v(t))
or
d
dt
(
βt
u(t)
)
= 0; t ∈ [0, T ).
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From this we deduce that
u(t) = C1βt ; t ∈ [0, T )
i.e.
γt = C1σt ; t ∈ [0, T )
for some constant C1. Hence, by (4.23)
βt
σt
St (β) = C2σt , t ∈ [0, T ) (4.32)
where C2 = 12 C1.
We conclude that the optimal βt must satisfy the equation
βt = C2σ
2
t
St (β)
. (4.33)
Hence, by (4.30)
ST (β) = lim
t→T −
St (β) = 0. (4.34)
Moreover, by (4.22) and (4.32),
d
dt
St (β) = −
(
βt
σt
St (β)
)2
= −C22σ 2t ,
which integrates to
St (β) = ST (β) + C22
T∫
t
σ 2s ds = C22
T∫
t
σ 2s ds.
Choosing t = 0 we get
C2 =
[
S0∫ T
0 σ
2
s ds
]1/2
.
Hence, β = β∗ is optimal iff
St (β) = S0
∫ T
t σ
2
s ds∫ T
0 σ
2
s ds
(4.35)
and the optimal β = β∗ is given explicitly by
βt = S
1/2
0 (
∫ T
0 σ
2
s ds)1/2σ 2t
S0
∫ T
t σ
2
s ds
; t ∈ [0, T ). (4.36)
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This gives that the maximal value J (β∗) of J (β) is
J (β) =
T∫
0
St (β)βt dt
=
⎡
⎣S0
T∫
0
σ 2s ds
⎤
⎦
1/2
(4.37)
and hence that the maximal expected terminal wealth of the insider is
E[wT ] = w0 +
⎡
⎣S0
T∫
0
σ 2s ds
⎤
⎦
1/2
. (4.38)
Finally, by the Kalman–Bucy filter the corresponding filtered estimate pt is given by
pt = E[v˜] +
t∫
0
λsdys; t ∈ [0, T ], (4.39)
where the price sensitivity λt is given by
λt = St (β)βt
σ 2t
=
[
S0∫ T
0 σ
2
s ds
]1/2
; t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.40)
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.1.
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